Zachary Wu – Page 2 – SailorFanTalk

[Tactical Analysis] Soundly Beaten (Tampines 4 LCS 3)

The following tactical analysis is from Zach Wu, who’s not a Sailors fan, but we just thought it would be good for someone without rose-tinted glasses to analyse the tactics of our games. We hope to make this a regular column so that we can better appreciate what is going on in our games from a tactical perspective. It was the best attack against the best defence, and my oh my, was it a memorable match indeed. Tampines’ approach Tampines’ positional play approach meant they had very different and well-defined shapes both on and off the ball. On the ball, their shape was not too similar to LCS, in a 4-2-3-1 shape. However, it was off the ball where Gavin really worked his positional play system. Off the ball, Tampines were in a 3-2-4-1/3-4-2-1 shape. Irfan would tuck in and form a back 3 with Milos and Shuya, the other centrebacks; Glenn would push up and hold the width on the left while Faris would hold the width on the right. Saifullah would also come in field from the left, with him and Yasir operating as the 2 playmakers behind Boris. This made Tampines extremely secure in possession; their 3-2 shape in defense made it almost impossible to be pressed (because of the number of passing options), especially when the midfield pivot is extremely stable. Add to that occasional dropping movements from Saifullah or Yasir to help hold the ball, that made it hard for LCS to take the ball off them. They also had outlets wide in the form of Glenn and Faris. LCS’s approach LCS’s approach was simple. Stay compact in their 4-2-3-1 shape and try to pick Tampines off on counter-attacks with their superb attackers on the transition. Exploiting leftbacks Tampines did this to perfection, targeting Chris (who has struggled in recent games) while LCS really struggled to target Tampines’ own leftback Glenn Kweh. Here, for the Tampines equalizer, Saifullah drops deep and then switches the ball out to Faris Ramli. Faris stays wide, stretching the pitch and allowing more time for him to take the ball down. Here, the LCS leftback, Chris van Huizen is a good few meters away and is only just jogging over. Van Huizen is then subsequently beaten easily by Faris who crosses the ball, forcing a keeping mistake from Zharfan and Yasir scores the equalizer. This was a relatively textbook goal from Tampines. Tampines ensured they had a local numerical superiority with Saifullah, making it hard to press and drawing Sailors over to the left side of the pitch. Once Tampines felt LCS had moved sufficient number of players over, they would isolate Chris van Huizen 1 vs 1 with Faris Ramli, and exploit their superior individual quality in that particular 1 vs 1 duel. It has to be said though while Chris took his time going out to Faris, Chris received little support from Lestienne in front of him or a covering midfielder or centreback and this could explain his reluctance to close Faris down quickly. It remained quite puzzling in the second half too, when Chris was obviously tired and struggling even more (before Faris was taken off) that Risto did little to help him, whether it be bringing on Zulqarnaen on the left (and switching Chris to rightback since they were chasing the game) or offering more support defensively to Chris. LCS themselves could have done the same to their opponents’ left back but failed to do so. Glenn Kweh, also another winger turned fullback has had shaky moments defensively, be it on his international debut against Hong Kong or his own goal later in the game. He was relatively untested with Hafiz Nor particularly ineffective against him. Lestienne on the other flank was also struggling against Irfan Najeeb. As mentioned earlier, with Tampines 3-2-4-1/3-4-2-1 shape, Irfan Najeeb would generally be conservative and not overlap, making him mostly goal-side of Lestienne. While Lestienne did assist the opener, he was generally ineffective against Irfan – nowhere near his usual high standards. Perhaps if Lestienne could run at Glenn Kweh directly, or exploit the space when Tampines moved from a back 3 to a back 4 when Glenn Kweh was high up the pitch, it would have been more effective. Diego too conservative in his positions? The LCS midfield often relied on rotations amongst Hami, Hariss and Diego to advance the ball. However, this often was not ideal. Quite often, Diego (red) would be picking the ball up deep. This was definitely not ideal. Diego is one of LCS’s best players and you would want him picking up the ball in tight pockets deep in the Tampines half making full use of his technical ability, not picking up the ball closer to his goal under lesser pressure. This was an extremely ineffective way to progress the ball forward and LCS surely has to work on this – get Diego the ball in tighter areas, further up the field. Conclusion As much as LCS coach Risto claimed it was a new team and still missing one of the foreigners, the Sailors were comprehensively played off the park on the day. The Sailors have had generally the same issues even since they won the league in 2021. In the bigger games facing opposition of similar quality, they have been too reliant on transitions and counter attacks. With a far weaker defense (as compared to under Coach Kim) and with a more progressive playstyle, this has led to the Sailors being porous defensively, able to use their superb attack to bail them out against lesser sides but totally ineffective against better sides. Looking forward, with Bernie signed, Shawal could play along the wing once again and give some flexibility in swapping the wingers as compared to Hafiz Nor who is primarily a touchline right winger. If the plan moving forward is to play on the counter in bigger games, Shawal and Lestienne in transition would be far more deadly than what has

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[Tactical Analysis] Smooth Sailing Once Again? (Quick Look at Sailors in Their Games Against Geylang and Balestier)

Leave a Comment / Tactics / Zachary Wu

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[Tactical Analysis] – Sailors Slain (Albirex 4 Sailors 0)

1 Comment / Tactics / Zachary Wu

The following tactical analysis is from Zach Wu, who’s not a Sailors fan, but we just thought it would be good for someone without rose-tinted glasses to analyse the tactics of our games. We hope to make this a regular column so that we can better appreciate what is going on in our games from a tactical perspective. As the full moon rose above the Jurong East Stadium, the werewolves were out for blood. Unfortunately for the Sailors, it was their blood that was shed all over the pitch. Here is the post-mortem … First Half The Sailors fielded the expected 11 in the absence of Nur Adam due to injury. Meanwhile for the Swans, Shodai Yokoyama dropped to the bench while Tadanari Lee made his first start of the season. It must be noted the strength of this year’s batch of Albirex players – Keito Hariya, a starter of last season’s title-winning side has played a total of 16 minutes thus far. Controversial red card Early on, the game was turned by a controversial VAR decision. Tadanari poked the ball past Anu, who cynically fouled him. While initially awarded a yellow card, it was overturned by VAR and Anu was given his marching orders. In the heat of the moment, I did feel it was extremely harsh. However, upon further review I could see why the referee had chosen to do so. He felt that Tadanari was taken down unfairly by Anu and with the covering defenders far away while Tadanari was fully sprinting, it would have been a clear and obvious denial of a goal scoring opportunity. Harsh, but correct by the book. In fact, a similar incident had happened in the A league with Tomislav Mrčela, having pulled down his opponent at a similar position to Anu, with the covering defenders extremely wide and saw red for a similar cynical foul. https://twitter.com/aleaguemen/status/1634175780828909570?s=20 (Editor’s note: That decision in the A-League is slightly different because the red card was brandished immediately. In the Albirex-Sailors game, the yellow card is given, so it would need a “clear and obvious error” for the referee to change his decision. Zach has been warned that such future nonsense opinions shall not be published on sailorfantalk.com. First strike, Zach, two more and I’ll throw you down the ledge from Bishan Stadium). Hami sacrificed In the immediate aftermath of the red card, LCS went to a 4-4-1-0. Bill filled in at centreback, Hafiz Nor went to rightback while Tanaka dropped to left wing. Diego operated like a false 9, coming short and holding the ball for runners leaving LCS with no striker up top. This did not last for long however with Hami taken off, Arshad Shamim playing at right back, Hafiz to the left wing, Diego at centre midfield and Tanaka alone upfront. This was more of a 4-4-0-1 as Tanaka got increasingly isolated upfront, up against 2 Albirex centrebacks. I personally did not like the change in setup for a couple of reasons. Firstly, LCS were holding well in their temporary shape. Secondly, taking off Hami so early on (18 minutes in) was a mistake as he was a midfielder who had plenty of energy and would have the eye for a forward pass or a dribble when LCS would want to spring counter attacks. Also, while there are 5 substitutes allowed nowadays, they are only allowed on 3 occasions which meant a sub this early on took away one of the occasions that LCS could potentially need later. Thirdly, throwing Arshad to right-back in one of the biggest and most high-pressure games was a poor decision as he is not naturally a fullback and given that Hafiz Nor spent most of last season already playing as a rightback, perhaps logically Hafiz should have stayed there. Arshad would subsequently concede the free kick (from a Rusyaidi Salime mistake) for Albirex’s third which was the final nail in the coffin. Lastly, this change ran contrary to how LCS were trying to play. Even after the red card, they were still trying to play their way through Albirex by holding the ball; they were not going long and playing solely counter attacking football. Hence by leaving Tanaka upfront alone, he was extremely isolated and LCS rarely got the ball to him. Diego as a false 9 could have been far more effective, being one of the best dribblers in the league, he could definitely hold up the ball to combine with midfield runners and win cheap fouls. This was a mistake by Vidakovic in my opinion. Lethargic off the ball (again!) As I mentioned in the previous game, LCS’s luxury players were not doing their fair share off the ball. This is just before the second Albirex goal. Here, LCS’s press is beaten. Lestienne does not even bother to press or win the ball back, leaving Albirex with 2 free players down the line. As Nicky Singh continues to run the ball down the line, the LCS players are out of position and dragged over. Even Hariss is ambling back and does not protect the space in front of the defense. This allows Nicky to cut infield and play a ball to the far side. Shuto Komaki holds up the ball intelligently, sucking Chris van Huizen inside before releasing the ball into space for the overlapping fullback Ryo Takahashi who slams it into the back of the net for Allbirex’s second. Just to recap, Lestienne does not track any Albirex player, Hariss does not cover the space in front of the defence while the far side winger Hafiz Nor is nowhere to be seen. This is all round lethargic and careless from the Sailors and a goal they should not have conceded even (especially!) when down to ten men. The lack of effort all round just 35 minutes into the game was abysmal. Surely, they should have run their butts off, keep it at 1-0, and get into half-time and hope the Coach can

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[Tactical Analysis] Room For Improvement (LCS 3 DPMM Brunei 1)

Leave a Comment / Tactics / Zachary Wu

The following tactical analysis is from Zach Wu, who’s not a Sailors fan, but we just thought it would be good for someone without rose-tinted glasses to analyse the tactics of our games. We hope to make this a regular column so that we can better appreciate what is going on in our games from a tactical perspective. It was a potential title decider just 2 weeks into the new season. However, both teams were far from being in title-challenging form, be it LCS’s new-look side settling in or DPMM playing in a far less competitive league of late. First Half LCS set up in their customary 4231, being relatively unchanged, bar Anu starting at centre back. Nur Adam, however, was replaced relatively early with a dislocated shoulder, so Van Huizen moved over to left back while Bill Mamadou filled in at right back. DPMM interestingly started in a 352/532 system not too dissimilar to the formation employed in their title-winning campaign in 2019 (image below). They were without one of their foreigners in Josip Balic, and Coach Adrian Pennock highlighted him as a key miss. Finding the free players Naturally, the free players for the 4231 team against a 532 team are the fullbacks because it is a 2v1 on the wings (winger and fullback (4231) vs one wingback (532)). However, just playing the ball to the fullbacks alone would make the team one-dimensional and the buildup flank-orientated (i.e. the ball only sticks to the wings). Here, seconds later from the previous image where the ball was on the left, LCS are able to find the far-sided fullback Bill Mamadou (pink) while the DPMM block is shifting over, allowing him time and space to drive the ball forward. After running with the ball a few meters, the DPMM midfield is slow to move across while the defence is too deep, creating a big space (red) in the centre. Unfortunately, Diego is too deep (pink). If LCS had been able to work the ball to Diego in this red area, he could do significant damage with the ball, given his ability. DPMM not up to speed Generally, DPMM seemed to be adapting to the game especially in the first half, even if they were moving slowly across and not compact – but the lead-up to the opening goal really summed up their lethargic approach. Here, LCS win a throw-in and take it quickly having seen DPMM’s right wingback caught out of position. Diego (red) spots this and makes a dart into the space. The covering centre-back is slow to respond and this leads to the cutback which Lestienne finishes. This is a routine error, with no one stopping LCS taking the quick throw in. In fact, even the seasoned #8 Hendra Azam is there but not even looking at the ball when the throw is taken. If DPMM want to go for the title again, such routine mistakes must not be repeated. While Coach Adrian Pennock told Eddy in a post-match interview that the players had thought the throw-in should have been awarded to them, it is still no excuse as players are taught to always play to the referee’s calls and be alert to what is going on around them. Second Half Luxury Players Switching Off Lestienne and Diego Lopes have been lauded for their plaudits with the ball, but off the ball, their contribution at times have been questionable especially later on in games. Here, LCS has just given the ball away. There are two pictures above and if you look at the first, what is happening there is the ball is attempted to be played into the box by the DPMM player. Lestienne sees four LCS players converging onto it, and gambles, by starting to angle his body forward and slowly jog forward in anticipation of a counter-attack if the ball can break kindly for an LCS player. This is either clever play, or coach’s instructions to gamble in such situations. However, when it becomes clear that there is some defending to be done, you will see that Tanaka and Lestienne have in fact continued advancing forward (observe the differences in their positions, and how they are now closer to the centre-circle), and make no attempt to close down space or put themselves closer to the action. Lopes is also watching the action instead of tucking in to be in a position to react to a potential loose ball. With Tanaka also upfront, this leaves LCS with just 7 outfielders to defend. This forces Lionel to step out to close the man down – far out from his preferred central defensive position (see below). He is not able to intercept, and the ball is swung to DPMM’s right. It eventually reaches Voronkov who forces a good save out of Zharfan. On another day, this could have been a goal. Akin to the Neymar-Mbappe-Messi situation at PSG, Vidakovic has to find a solution to ensure their marquee players do not cost the team defensively. Lack of control (and options) As the half wore on, both sides were starting to tire but with both sides pushing forward for a goal (be it Sailors for the third and DPMM for an equalizer), it remained a very open game. With Hariss the only defensive minded midfielder protecting the backline, and Hami naturally more attack-minded, the midfield was quite empty at times. Unfortunately given the centre-back situation, Anu had to be played in defense and there was no natural defensive midfielder on the bench. Perhaps Rusyaidi Salime could have come on to help plug the gap in midfield? While he isn’t a pure defensive midfielder, he posted pretty high defensive stats last season, and could have done a job in midfield. Conclusion As a whole, LCS generally played well, creating 2.1 xG against 1.27 of DPMM, especially factoring in the mistake by Zharfan. This was an improvement compared to the TPU game where they let in 1.78 xG against a

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[Tactical Analysis] Hami Hype (LCS 3 Tanjong Pagar 1)

Leave a Comment / Tactics / Zachary Wu

The following tactical analysis is from Zach Wu, who’s not a Sailors fan, but we just thought it would be good for someone without rose-tinted glasses to analyse the tactics of our games. We hope to make this a regular column so that we can better appreciate what is going on in our games from a tactical perspective. The opener of the 2023 season was certainly much anticipated, with both sides arguably adding upgrades to their squad. A rematch of opening day 2020, but the result could not have been anymore different. Tanjong Pagar approach The approach from the Jaguars was simple – sit deep in a mid to low block and take advantage of any opportunities on the break. There was some interesting use of players by Hasrin Jailani. He chose to double up against Lestienne’s threat on their right, moving two former LCS players (and two natural full backs) Naqiuddin and Tajeli onto Lestienne’s side. Elsewhere, Faizal Roslan a natural right footed centreback was forced to LWB (left wingback), Blake at left wing/left forward while youngster Azim Akbar (whom we have seen played as a right midfielder and is listed as such on transfermarkt.com) started at centre midfield, paired in a pivot with Mirko Sugic. Build-up issues While Tanjong Pagar are a direct team, being ALWAYS direct would present some issues. It is interesting to note that last season, Tanjong Pagar was the most direct team in the league, as they made an average of 40 long passes per match. Going direct all the time means your play becomes predictable, and you lose possession of the ball far too easily. Here, Pedro Dias on the ball has no options in the build-up stage. There are no midfielders that are free and within a reasonable passing distance from him (red box) and hence is forced to go long. The LCS players on the pitch would have recognized that there are no immediate passing options for Pedro Dias and thus would squeeze up on him, making it more difficult for Pedro Dias to send an accurate long ball while also being more prepared to win the second ball after the long ball is played. While it is okay to go direct, there has to be a plan to keep the ball on the ground when necessary, in order to ensure your play does not become predictable. Tanjong Pagar did not have this back-up plan in mind. LCS approach With Shawal, Anu, Pedro, Izwan the big names out for the Sailors, they started in their usual 4-2-3-1 shape with the expected names. However, there were interesting tweaks that Vidakovic made to the team that made them far more effective. Numerical advantage Vidakovic’s gameplan to pin Tanjong Pagar’s back 5 with LCS’s front 4, leaving 6 LCS players in a 4-2 (from their 4-2-3-1) to shape up against 5 Tanjong Pagar players. With this numerical advantage, it made it difficult for Tanjong Pagar to press LCS, allowing LCS to shift the ball from side to side easily. 1 in, 1 out While still utilizing the 4-2-3-1 shape, Vidakovic’s changes were subtle but effective. Instead of pushing both fullbacks high up the pitch (as we like to think of attacking football), Vidakovic kept both deep. This is the key part. While keeping both deep, he kept one infield (like an inverted fullback) while the other would be outfield (like a traditional fullback). Here (image above), Nur Adam (pink) has the ball on the touchline. CvH (Chris van Huizen) (red) anticipates the ball is being played back to the other centrebacks and moves infield to try and link up with his other defenders instead of hugging the touchline on his side. Likewise here (image above), Nur Adam (pink) is holding the width on the touchline while CvH(red) is coming infield. This “one in, one out” is also applicable here. Lestienne (orange) is holding the width down the touchline with the ball. Nur Adam(blue) sees the space ahead of him and makes an underlapping run infield (blue arrow) to create space for Lestienne. With this simple principle of one infield and one outfield, be it fullback-fullback or fullback-winger, this creates staggering that disrupts the opponents’ shape and allows LCS to progress the ball forward better. Hami reborn Hami was a player reborn, having been underutilized last season under various coaches, he delivered a commanding assured display. While small in stature, he was incredibly composed on the ball and was a perfect fit for Vidakovic’s more patient ball-heavy approach, especially in the Sailors’ own third. Hami left the pitch on 81min, but by then he had made 53 passes with a 92% passing accuracy (highest on the pitch), a productive day in the office. With the departure of Shahdan Sulaiman, Vidakovic filled the void by fielding Hariss back in his usual midfield position. With the added defensive stability by the more mobile Hariss (and having spent the past 1.5 seasons largely in defense honing his game), Hami was able to play a box-to-box role, with the freedom to take more risks on the ball. Hopefully this is the breakout season for the 2019 YPOTY (Young Player of the Year) to stamp his mark on the Sailors team. (Note from Eddy: I’ve been bleating on for years about how Hami is the Singaporean Thiago and now hopefully we get to see him get an extended run in the team!) Second half From a tactical standpoint, little changed. Tanjong Pagar continued to sit in their 5-4-1 formation, hoping to nick a goal while keeping themselves in the game while LCS maintained their steady, measured approach to break down Tanjong Pagar’s block. Aside from the penalty and Shahrin’s header, Tanjong Pagar were unable to create anything of note against the resolute Sailors. Interestingly, Hasrin did not turn to the bench, with 2 pacey young wingers in the form of Khairul Hairie and Zulfadhmi Suzliman eager to run at a tiring Sailors backline. When Tanjong Pagar opened up the

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[Tactical Analysis] Hafiz Nor on the Wrong Flank (LCS 1 Albirex 2)

Leave a Comment / Tactics / Zachary Wu

The following tactical analysis is from Zach Wu, who’s not a Sailors fan, but we just thought it would be good for someone without rose-tinted glasses to analyse the tactics of our games. We hope to make this a regular column so that we can better appreciate what is going on in our games from a tactical perspective. This was the big one. With a point salvaged from the Young Lions game, the Sailors’ fate was still in their hands. It was do or die for the Sailors. A win would guarantee qualification while anything less would need results from the Balestier-Young Lions game to go their way. Lalic’s curious tactical choices Lalic made very interesting choices, especially in the absence of a proper leftback. Bill came in at right back while Hafiz Nor and Anu stayed in the same positions from the previous game. Curiously, Hariss was used in midfield (who was mostly deployed as a centreback in season) and Anu in defence as compared to the other way round. From the above screenshot, look at Hafiz Nor’s body positioning just as he is about to receive the ball. He is facing his own goal and the only real option (within his eyeline) he has is to play the ball back to Amirul Adli who then has to launch the ball long afterwards. Hafiz Nor really struggled in an unfamiliar role. While understandable to keep Bill at rightback given his right footedness and inexperience, it was really a handicap to the team especially with Hafiz Nor being very uncomfortable at leftback and unable to make his trademark overlapping runs we have seen this season. Instead, it might have been better to swap the fullbacks. This would also have helped Gabriel who is a left footer on the right and hence would have a tendency to cut in anyways, allowing Hafiz Nor to overlap and cross on his strong right foot. I will elaborate on this point later in the article. Also, this would have placed Bill away from the tricky Sugita who has been one of the best wingers in the past season and up against Sambongi, a natural fullback. Bill was anyways not overlapping much on the right and staying back, hence keeping him on the right or left would not have made a big difference while there was big upside if LCS would get Hafiz Nor at right back overlapping and swinging crosses into the box. The other curious decision was Anu and Hariss switching positions (from what they were usually used in this season). I can partly understand why Lalic chose to play them in those positions. Lalic must have seen Anu’s lack of technical security on the ball and hence moved him to a position that required less technical security, especially against an Albirex side that was going to sit deep anyways and not pressure the centrebacks. Anu being primarily a destroyer may not have been in Lalic’s vision to play football, unable to switch balls to the flanks as consistently as Hariss or Shahdan could. However with Anu’s struggles in defense earlier in the regular season as compared to Hariss’s calm and composed demeanour, it was still a curious choice. Instead, LCS could have chosen to line up like this. Hariss would bring much more familiarity and security at the back, Hafiz Nor could overlap comfortably on the right while Shahdan could play this familiar deep lying playmaker position. Anu in midfield could also use his athleticism to cover for Shadan’s ageing legs. By allowing Shahdan to get onto the ball more, his technical abilities would solve LCS’s distribution issues and allow them to connect the back 6 (in picture) to the front 4 (of the LCS attackers) far easier. Overlaps the key Despite all the tactical issues, LCS were able to create good quality chances through simple overlaps. Even without fullback support, LCS could still use simple overlaps (with their superior player quality) to fashion chances. Here, Diego (red) is engaging the player while Lestienne (purple) runs on the outside to overlap him before sending a cross/cutback that falls to Gabriel whose shot is then blocked for a corner. Likewise here, there is a player holding the ball up(red) and an overlapping runner (purple) to cut the ball back into the box. Unfortunately, Faris misses here when it falls to him. While it is easy to blame the players who have missed those chances, Lalic should have set up LCS so as to increase the potency of such dangerous cutbacks especially considering LCS were starting without a natural striker who could finish such chances. How should he have done that? In both aforementioned cases, there were only 2 players attacking the cutback, the 2 players in the box. LCS could have increased this potency by increasing the number of players attacking the box. This hypothetical situation could be created if Hafiz Nor was played at right back and overlapping Gabriel instead. Here, Gabriel is on the ball (yellow star) and being left-footed would naturally come inside from the right. This would lure his direct opponent, the opposition leftback Toyomura inside. With the space now created, Hafiz Nor can now run onto the ball and potentially send a dangerous cross or cutback (purple). Being a winger played at fullback, the delivery would definitely be potent. This would add an extra LCS body into the box, with 3 instead of 2 too, making this simple overlapping move far more potent. Even by committing that extra body (Hafiz Nor in the previous case) into attack, LCS would still have a 5 vs 4 scenario to guard against any Albirex counter attacks, making LCS secure against any transitions that Albirex might spring. LCS were not brave enough to commit enough bodies into the attack and that blunted their attack. Controlling transitions Another big issue for LCS was the poor control of space on attack-to-defense transitions. Transitions are the moments when the ball is lost or gained

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[Tactical Analysis] Lalic’s Curious Lineup Choices (Young Lions 1 LCS 1)

Leave a Comment / Tactics / Zachary Wu

The following tactical analysis is from Zach Wu, who’s not a Sailors fan, but we just thought it would be good for someone without rose-tinted glasses to analyse the tactics of our games. We hope to make this a regular column so that we can better appreciate what is going on in our games from a tactical perspective. It may have seemed like a foregone conclusion. But no, the Young Lions ran their hearts out against the recently-deposed champions to hold them to an impressive score-draw. The Sailors put out a very attacking lineup – seemingly because of their need for goals. Having drawn against Balestier Khalsa, if both LCS and Balestier were to have identical results against Albirex, qualification out of the group would then be down to goal difference. Young Lions Setup The Young Lions fielded a patched-up side, with understandable absentees (as it was a Monday night) due to national service or schooling commitments. Nazri Nasir set the Young Lions up in a deep 4-1-4-1 block, but played Amir Syafiz (a usual centre midfielder) upfront for his workrate and to shut down balls being played into the centre to force the Sailors out wide. The approach was clear – sit deep to frustrate the Sailors and to possibly nick a goal on a counter or a set piece. Lion City Sailors Setup For the Sailors, they welcomed back Diego Lopes to the bench while captain Hariss and Shahdan were dropped to the bench. This lineup was a curious one – with Hafiz Nor at leftback, Anu at centreback and Haiqal Pashia at rightback. It was a very inexperienced back 4. Saifullah had a lot of licence to go forward, with Adam Swandi sitting in front of the defense. The Sailors’ on the ball shape often looked more like a 4-1-4-1, with Saifullah and Gabriel the 2 #8s ahead of Adam Swandi. The approach of the Sailors was clear. They deployed two wide players with their natural foot on each flank. This was a slightly different approach compared to under their previous coach Kim, who would have used Faris as a #10 while Lestienne and Gabriel roamed the flanks. Here, Lestienne was played on the left and Faris on the right, intending to stretch play on the wings on their natural foot and use their individual ability to beat their man and send crosses in. Hafiz Nor used on the left was also instructed to underlap Lestienne when possible. LCS’s lack of compactness Personally, I felt the lack of compactness was LCS’s biggest issue. The team felt very disjointed, with the front 5 being very disconnected from the back 5 (we will refer Adam Swandi and the back 4 as the “back 5”). In the picture above, you’ll see that the Young Lions are on the break. However, look at LCS’s defensive shape. There is only Adam Swandi in midfield to plug the gigantic hole in midfield while the defensive line is so deep that it is entirely out of the picture. That is poor compactness. Even if LCS were to win the ball back here, it would be difficult to find the attackers too, given the large distances needed to get the ball into the final third. Instead, the attackers need to be more well positioned to counter-press and the defensive line needs to be way higher up the pitch, to better stop counters. Playing an inexperienced backline that has never played together, Lalic has to be at fault here. The defensive line must have felt unsure in stepping up and decided to play it safe instead and dropped deep. The lack of compactness really killed LCS on transitions. LCS missing a link player It was apparent that the Sailors were missing a link player too. Their best link player was used as a deep lying playmaker sitting in front of defense. With Adam Swandi the deepest of all the midfielders, it was apparent that the back 5 were very disconnected with the front 5 (rest of the outfielders). Saifullah and Gabriel took turns to drop deep but their movements were inconsistent and ineffective. As a result, the Sailors’ play lacked a central presence and all the play went down the flanks. Here, there is only 1 player (yellow) within the Young Lions defensive block, making it hard to progress play through the centre. In addition, Adam Swandi (purple) is closely marked by the Young Lions makeshift striker making it extremely difficult to switch play to the far side. The play then has to go down the flanks or back to the centrebacks. Instead, the Sailors should be exploiting the space (orange) here. A Sailors player, be it Kim Shin Wook or Gabriel should be in this zone, forcing the Young Lions to cover this zone and also allowing them numerical superiority in a wide area to render their flank play more effective. The Sailors should also have looked for opportunities like this to penetrate the Young Lions centrally. Instead of a diagonal ball out to the flanks (which Adam Swandi did eventually play), Adam Swandi (orange) should try to find Saifullah (yellow) centrally. Shah Shahiran has turned his body infield and Saifullah is on his blind side, making the pass possible. Once played to Saifullah, he can turn and drive with the ball or possibly play it to Faris (purple). This would allow the Sailors to attack the Young Lions’ backline directly and bypass the midfield. First Half Even with their possession issues, LCS still managed to create a handful of good chances with their superior player quality that could have gone in with better finishing. Maxime was bogged down by Danial Crichton, unable to beat his man consistently. It was even such an issue that after the first water break midway, Lalic instructed Faris and Maxime to swap flanks. The Young Lions were generally quite solid but they offered very little offensively and even switched off for a quick free kick, which showed their

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[Tactical Analysis] Sailors Rue Individual Errors (Sailors 3 Balestier Khalsa 3)

Leave a Comment / Tactics / Zachary Wu

The following tactical analysis is from Zach Wu, who’s not a Sailors fan, but we just thought it would be good for someone without rose-tinted glasses to analyse the tactics of our games. We hope to make this a regular column so that we can better appreciate what is going on in our games from a tactical perspective. Last time these 2 teams met, Balestier romped to a 5-3 win in rainy conditions, albeit helped by the Toa Payoh pitch which stunted the Sailors’ passing game. Here, the rematch was at Jalan Besar Stadium which allowed both teams to keep the ball and play some thrilling football. While the top 2 of each group would progress to the next stage, it was imperative that the Sailors finish top, to possibly draw the (potentially weaker) runner-up team and to possibly gain some morale and confidence, having just lost the title to Albirex. 1st Half LCS’s shape Here off the ball, LCS went into a flat 451 shape, intending to prevent Balestier from playing through their centre and force the play out wide. LCS hoped by forcing the play out wide, they would be able to use their superior individual quality to win the duels out there. On the ball, LCS played a curious 433 shape with Shahdan Sulaiman the most advanced of the midfield 3. While Shahdan has played there before, he has not played there of late, and it certainly showed. Early on, Lalic encouraged his keeper Izwan Mahbud to come out of his box and play. With Balestier leaving Hoshino upfront with Kondo slightly behind, Lalic could then create a 3 vs 1 scenario to play around Hoshino’s solo press and give his centrebacks Hariss and Amirul more time and space to drive the ball forward unopposed. LCS wing dynamics Interestingly, down the 2 wings, LCS had slightly different patterns. Hafiz Nor acted as a traditional overlapping fullback, allowing Faris inside and to operate in more central areas. On the other side, Nur Adam Abdullah had a more flexible role, sometimes joining the other 2 centrebacks as a back 3 in buildup, sometimes overlapping Lestienne or even inverting infield when Lestienne held the width. LCS’s wing rotations were stifled by heavy man marking by Balestier. As Faris Ramli cuts infield (yellow), he is closely followed by Delwinder Singh which opens the (blue) space behind. Hafiz Nor (purple) tries to exploit this space with an underlapping run. However, Ho Wai Loon (purple) has tracked this run, making LCS play the ball backwards to recycle. Balestier’s gameplan Balestier’s gameplan was simple but solid. Sit in two solid disciplined banks of four (purple) and take advantage of transitions to pick off LCS. Kuraba Kondo (yellow) the central playmaker was also tasked in blocking passing lanes into the Sailors’ centre midfielders. With Sailors missing creative players, this defensive setup would indeed prove troublesome for the Sailors. LCS lack of players in the box LCS were already struggling to get into wide positions due to Balestier’s gameplan previously mentioned. Furthermore, LCS seemed very hesitant to use crosses to attack the box, unwilling to use Kim Shin Wook’s aerial prowess. Instead, they wanted to play through Balestier. It was possibly an intentional tactic from LCS, to prevent the loss of the ball to the opponent, hence saving energy for this busy period ahead. On most days it might have worked but the LCS’s attackers had an off day in general in the first half. 2nd Half At the break, there were no changes in personnel. Both sides made small tweaks to their gameplan. Peter de Roo having seen his side concede from a cross with no pressure put onto it asked his team to be far more aggressive when closing down their direct opponents while Luka Lalic ditched asking Izwan to come out for build-ups having seen the potency of Balestier’s counters. Instead, Nur Adam usually dropped to form a third centreback in buildup. Hafiz Nor switches off While Hafiz Nor has been impressive cover at Right Back ever since the departure of Tajeli Salamat, this match showed why he may not be the perfect fit there. While good on the ball and has decent 1 vs 1 ability, this match showed his lack of defensive awareness in covering space. Here, for the second Balestier goal, Hafiz is just attracted to the ball which is played infield to Shuhei Hoshino (yellow). He does not look around and scan, fails to recognize that Kuraba Kondo (blue) is making a run to attack the space and cannot get back in time, resulting in Kondo getting the second goal for Balestier. Here, for the third goal Hafiz makes the same mistake again. He is again attracted to the ball, not realizing there is a blind side runner on him (red). Here Delwinder Singh (red), ghosts in on Hafiz’s blind side untracked which causes the scramble that led to Balestier putting in their 3rd of the night. Hence, it was no surprise when Hafiz Nor was hooked for Saifullah Akbar who played a like-for-like role, even hitting the post with his left foot. Substitutions Balestier, persisted with their approach from the first half (albeit with greater intensity) and all substitutes were like for like bar Aidil Johari, who was sent on to run the flank after Daniel Goh went off with cramp. The Sailors however, made an offensive change, taking off the ineffective Shahdan Sulaiman and bringing on Gabriel Quak. This meant that Faris was shifted to the #10 role and the Sailors were in a more familiar 4231 shape. It very nearly worked, with Gabriel’s goal being wrongly ruled out for offside, much to the Sailors’ dismay. Conclusion Lalic must be extremely frustrated, given the way that the Sailors gave up their goals even when using a supposedly more conservative approach with 3 midfielders meant to cover the centre. Realistically, they must now beat Albirex to have any chance to top the group which they have only

[Tactical Analysis] Sailors Rue Individual Errors (Sailors 3 Balestier Khalsa 3) Read More »

Author name: Zachary Wu