April 2023

The following tactical analysis is from Zach Wu, who’s not a Sailors fan, but we just thought it would be good for someone without rose-tinted glasses to analyse the tactics of our games. We hope to make this a regular column so that we can better appreciate what is going on in our games from a tactical perspective. It was the best attack against the best defence, and my oh my, was it a memorable match indeed. Tampines’ approach Tampines’ positional play approach meant they had very different and well-defined shapes both on and off the ball. On the ball, their shape was not too similar to LCS, in a 4-2-3-1 shape. However, it was off the ball where Gavin really worked his positional play system. Off the ball, Tampines were in a 3-2-4-1/3-4-2-1 shape. Irfan would tuck in and form a back 3 with Milos and Shuya, the other centrebacks; Glenn would push up and hold the width on the left while Faris would hold the width on the right. Saifullah would also come in field from the left, with him and Yasir operating as the 2 playmakers behind Boris. This made Tampines extremely secure in possession; their 3-2 shape in defense made it almost impossible to be pressed (because of the number of passing options), especially when the midfield pivot is extremely stable. Add to that occasional dropping movements from Saifullah or Yasir to help hold the ball, that made it hard for LCS to take the ball off them. They also had outlets wide in the form of Glenn and Faris. LCS’s approach LCS’s approach was simple. Stay compact in their 4-2-3-1 shape and try to pick Tampines off on counter-attacks with their superb attackers on the transition. Exploiting leftbacks Tampines did this to perfection, targeting Chris (who has struggled in recent games) while LCS really struggled to target Tampines’ own leftback Glenn Kweh. Here, for the Tampines equalizer, Saifullah drops deep and then switches the ball out to Faris Ramli. Faris stays wide, stretching the pitch and allowing more time for him to take the ball down. Here, the LCS leftback, Chris van Huizen is a good few meters away and is only just jogging over. Van Huizen is then subsequently beaten easily by Faris who crosses the ball, forcing a keeping mistake from Zharfan and Yasir scores the equalizer. This was a relatively textbook goal from Tampines. Tampines ensured they had a local numerical superiority with Saifullah, making it hard to press and drawing Sailors over to the left side of the pitch. Once Tampines felt LCS had moved sufficient number of players over, they would isolate Chris van Huizen 1 vs 1 with Faris Ramli, and exploit their superior individual quality in that particular 1 vs 1 duel. It has to be said though while Chris took his time going out to Faris, Chris received little support from Lestienne in front of him or a covering midfielder or centreback and this could explain his reluctance to close Faris down quickly. It remained quite puzzling in the second half too, when Chris was obviously tired and struggling even more (before Faris was taken off) that Risto did little to help him, whether it be bringing on Zulqarnaen on the left (and switching Chris to rightback since they were chasing the game) or offering more support defensively to Chris. LCS themselves could have done the same to their opponents’ left back but failed to do so. Glenn Kweh, also another winger turned fullback has had shaky moments defensively, be it on his international debut against Hong Kong or his own goal later in the game. He was relatively untested with Hafiz Nor particularly ineffective against him. Lestienne on the other flank was also struggling against Irfan Najeeb. As mentioned earlier, with Tampines 3-2-4-1/3-4-2-1 shape, Irfan Najeeb would generally be conservative and not overlap, making him mostly goal-side of Lestienne. While Lestienne did assist the opener, he was generally ineffective against Irfan – nowhere near his usual high standards. Perhaps if Lestienne could run at Glenn Kweh directly, or exploit the space when Tampines moved from a back 3 to a back 4 when Glenn Kweh was high up the pitch, it would have been more effective. Diego too conservative in his positions? The LCS midfield often relied on rotations amongst Hami, Hariss and Diego to advance the ball. However, this often was not ideal. Quite often, Diego (red) would be picking the ball up deep. This was definitely not ideal. Diego is one of LCS’s best players and you would want him picking up the ball in tight pockets deep in the Tampines half making full use of his technical ability, not picking up the ball closer to his goal under lesser pressure. This was an extremely ineffective way to progress the ball forward and LCS surely has to work on this – get Diego the ball in tighter areas, further up the field. Conclusion As much as LCS coach Risto claimed it was a new team and still missing one of the foreigners, the Sailors were comprehensively played off the park on the day. The Sailors have had generally the same issues even since they won the league in 2021. In the bigger games facing opposition of similar quality, they have been too reliant on transitions and counter attacks. With a far weaker defense (as compared to under Coach Kim) and with a more progressive playstyle, this has led to the Sailors being porous defensively, able to use their superb attack to bail them out against lesser sides but totally ineffective against better sides. Looking forward, with Bernie signed, Shawal could play along the wing once again and give some flexibility in swapping the wingers as compared to Hafiz Nor who is primarily a touchline right winger. If the plan moving forward is to play on the counter in bigger games, Shawal and Lestienne in transition would be far more deadly than what has